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WHERE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AND NET 
NEUTRALITY COLLIDE – HOW THE EU 
TELECOMS PACKAGE SUPPORTS TWO 
CORPORATE POLITICAL AGENDAS FOR THE 
INTERNET 
 
Monica Horten 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses a change to European Union (EU) telecoms law 
which de facto permits operators to impose restrictions on network traffic, 
and which enables such restrictions to be imposed for the purposes of 
copyright enforcement—thus it simultaneously facilitates two different 
policy agendas from the copyright and telecoms industries—‘three-strikes’ 
as well as ‘traffic management.’  The mechanism is a provision concerning 
users’ contracts, supported by generic provisions addressed to EU 
governments and regulators.  The change went into law in late 2009, within 
the so-called ‘Telecoms Package,’ which, together with the E-commerce 
directive, establishes the EU legal framework for telecoms networks.  In 
terms of the latest initiative on IP Enforcement, ACTA, this is the much-
cited EU aquis communitaire, with which ACTA must comply.  This paper 
addresses how the change came into being and possible interpretations and 
implications for copyright enforcement policy.  
The research for this paper forms part of the author’s doctoral research.*  
The Telecoms Package policy process was observed contemporaneously as 
part of a cross-disciplinary policy study, and the analysis of the legislation 
in this paper relies on original EU policy and legislative documents.  
*The author successfully defended her thesis on 7 September 2010.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
How can an apparently small change in European Union telecoms law 
enable a shift in enforcement of copyright?  Telecoms law of course, does 
not address copyright, or content, and therefore it cannot directly specify 
any enforcement action in respect of copyright. However, it can be used to 
give instructions to network operators, on the basis of a policy decision.  
This paper investigates how this was done in one provision in the EU 
Telecoms Package.  This provision is split between a clause on subscriber 
contracts and a linked clause on transparency, which were both altered 
during the legislative process to fulfil the requirements of two groups of 
industry lobbyists.  The rights-holder industries wanted to enable graduated 
response.  The telecommunications industry wanted to enable traffic 
management.  In the policy haggling over the subscriber contracts 
provision, the two agendas were observed to collide, in the sense that 
restrictions to Internet access became necessary for both agendas.  Using 
concepts drawn from both copyright and telecoms law, this paper draws on 
policy documents to establish what the lobby groups wanted and their 
intended interpretation of the amendments; and using current news sources, 
it makes some observations on the implementation one year on from the 
Telecoms Package passing into law.  The paper argues that the outcome, 
which enables restrictions on Internet use, suited both stakeholder groups, 
and that it ultimately supports the new environment of ‘co-operative efforts’ 
specified in ACTA. 
 
II. POLICY ISSUES FOR THE TELECOMS PACKAGE 
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The Telecoms Package
1
 was a review of the European Union Telecoms 
Framework law which provides the common rules governing all electronic 
communications, including providers of Internet access.  It had last been 
reviewed in 2002 and was based on a principle of open network provision, 
where national regulators had the power to enforce access, interconnection, 
and inter-operability between services.
2
  This had the effect of protecting 
users’ ability to obtain a connection to anywhere, irrespective of which 
network they were on.  The purpose of the Telecoms Package review was 
primarily to address issues related to market-based competition for network 
operators, specifically in the commercial relationships between operators.  
In particular, the Package sought to assess any changes that were needed in 
light of technological developments.  Its main objective was to roll back ex 
ante regulation, and increase the application of competition law.  In this 
context, the policy agenda included the functional separation of retail and 
wholesale telecoms services, and the establishment of a new European 
regulatory authority.  A second objective of the review was to address 
users’ rights, where ‘rights’ referred to consumer protection and the 
commercial, contractual relationships between the operators and their 
subscribers.
3
  The scope of the review specifically excluded all issues 
concerning content, and of course, copyright.  It was, however, an 
opportunity to alter the scope of the network operators’ terms of service, 
and it is this possibility that concerns us here.  
The Telecoms Package went through the EU legislative process 
from 2006–2009.  During this period the two industry agendas emerged 
simultaneously, and were presented to European policy-makers with a 
series of demands.  The rights-holder community came up with an 
enforcement solution to address peer-to-peer file-sharing and the alleged 
copyright infringements taking place over peer-to-peer networks.  This 
solution was called graduated response, but in order to implement it, they 
needed to get a political instruction to the network operators.  Graduated 
response proposed that the network operators could implement sanctions 
against subscribers who were alleged to have infringed copyright.  It can be 
established from policy documents that the core concept of graduated 
response comprised a series of warnings sent to Internet subscribers, 
                                                 
1
 Council Directive 2009/136/EC, 2009 O.J. (L.337) 11; Council Directive 
2009/14/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37; Council Regulation 1211/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 1 
(EC). 
2
 Council Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive), art. 5.1, 2002 O.J. 
(L 108) 7, 12.  
3
 See European Commission SEC (2007) 1472, Commission Staff Working Document, 
Impact Assessment, 6-8 (Nov. 13, 2007. 
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followed by a sanction.  The sanction may consisted of cutting off the 
subscriber’s access to Internet services, or but it may also entail the slowing 
of bandwidth or blocking of connections, or restricting access to the Internet 
using network filtering or traffic management techniques.
4
 
In parallel, the network operators were evolving a new technology, 
known as traffic management, which enabled them to have more control 
over the data flowing on their networks.  This policy agenda is frequently 
referred to as ‘net neutrality’ but in the context of the Telecoms Package, it 
actually concerned the telecommunications industry’s demand to be able to 
run traffic management systems which would enable them to operate the 
networks in a non-neutral way and, among other things, throttle user 
transmission speeds, prioritise traffic, and operate discriminatory policies in 
respect of Internet traffic.  The European telecoms industry lobbying 
documents highlighted prioritisation of services, and they formulated an 
argument to oppose any policy which would “mandate non-discriminatory 
treatment of network traffic.”
5
  In other words, they wanted to use traffic 
management systems without any regulatory oversight, and they did not 
want anything akin to a net neutrality principle.  
The first draft of the Telecoms Package appeared on 13 November 
2007, when it was unveiled by the European Commission.
6
  Provisions 
addressing both copyright enforcement and traffic management had been 
inserted.  They were to be found in the Universal Services Directive, Article 
20, subscriber contracts, and Article 21, transparency.
7
   
 
III. THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES’ AGENDA FOR GRADUATED RESPONSE  
 
Graduated response is, in essence, a system of warnings followed by a 
                                                 
4
 Mission Olivennes, Le developpement et la protection des oeuvres culturelles sur les 
nouveaux reseaux.  Rapport au ministre de la culture et de la communication report, p. 17, 
available at www.elysee.fr/download/?mode=press&filename=rapport-missionOlivennes-
23novembre2007.pdf  [hereinafter Mission Olivennes] (“Il consiste à ce  que les 
fournisseurs d’accès à internet, saisis par les ayants droit d’actes susceptibles d’être de la  
contrefaçon, envoient dans un premier temps plusieurs messages d’information et, en cas 
de  récidive, prennent une sanction, telle que la diminution provisoire de la bande 
passante, l’interruption de l’abonnement, voire sa résiliation.”)  
5
 Net Confidence Coalition, Ensuring Network Stability and Consumer Confidence in 
Competitive Markets 1, available at 
http://www.cableeurope.eu/uploads/Publications/documents/4870%20-
%20Network%20Management%20Coalition%20Stmt%20_06-10-08_%20FINAL_.pdf. 
6
 The European Commission draft of the Telecoms Package (Nov. 13, 2007) comprises 
2 documents:  COM (2007) 0697 – Framework, Access and Authorisation directive and 
COM(2007) 698 final – Universal Services and e-Privacy Directive.   
7
 See COM(2007) 698, art. 20 and 21. 
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sanction.
8
  The warnings would be transmitted by the network provider to 
the user, either by email or by post.  If further allegations were made against 
the subscriber, the network provider may be asked to apply a sanction, 
which may be to cut off their access, or it may be throttle their bandwidth, 
or prevent them from using specific protocols, requiring the operator to 
implement traffic management systems.  Graduated response targets peer-
to-peer file-sharing in particular.  Notably, the sanction is applied directly 
against the Internet access subscriber, which differs from existing 
enforcement regimes where the sanction is applied against a commercial 
provider, or against a person who consciously posted material on a web 
server.  Graduated response requires the broadband providers to work ‘co-
operatively’ with the rights-holders, and—depending on the national legal 
requirements and the individual State implementation—there is not 
necessarily a public authority or a court intermediating.  The mechanism for 
making it work is the subscriber’s contract, as is outlined by the 
International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) representing the 
recorded music industry, in their response to a European Commission 
Consultation in 2008:  
 
[A]n effective warning and sanctions system based on the sending 
of a warning by the ISPs to their subscribers, followed by the 
suspension and, eventually, the termination of the contract if the 
subscriber insists on continuing to infringe. This system formally 
applies the contractual conditions that most ISPs already have in 
their contracts but which they have until now refused to enforce.
9
 
 
The first legislative proposal for graduated response was the Creation 
and Internet law of 12 June 2009, in France
10
 in which two warnings were 
proposed, and the third allegation of infringement would incur the sanction.  
Hence it is colloquially known as ‘three strikes and you’re out.’  The UK 
followed with the Digital Economy Act, passed by the Parliament on 6 
April 2010.
11
  The law proposed a form of graduated response, as confirmed 
                                                 
8
 See id. 4; see also Mission Olivennes, supra note 4. 
9
 Creative Content Online, IFPI Response to the Commission Consultation 13 (Feb. 29 
2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/col_2008/ngo/ifpi_en.pdf  
10
 Creation and Internet law:  Loi n 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et 
la protection de la création sur internet, 12 Juin 2009, available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=01E95EE37B316AB4B19955279
DCADC77.tpdjo02v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020735432&categorieLien=id#. 
11
 Digital Economy Act 2010, Sections 3-18, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/ukpga_20100024_en_1. 
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by Lord Young of Norwood Green, the government Minister who led it 
through the House of Lords
12
: “our process might well be described as 
taking a graduated approach.”   
The creative industries had been putting pressure on the EU and the 
Member State governments regarding graduated response for several years.  
The first political achievement of the creative industry lobbyists was the 
Cannes Declaration which stated that “the Ministers and the European 
Commissioner continue to support the exchange of best practices in the 
fight against piracy and in this respect the ‘graduated response . . . is a 
major step forward.”
13
  In particular, the lobbyists targeted the Telecoms 
Package.  The Motion Picture Association (MPA) representing the 
Hollywood studios, called on the European Commission “to seize the 
opportunity of the ongoing legislative review of the so-called “Telecoms 
Package… for setting the ground rules for stakeholder co-operation to be 
both encouraged and facilitated at the EU level.”
14
 
What were these ground rules that MPA wanted in the Telecoms 
Package?  Exactly as the IFPI had stated in their lobbying document (see 
above), the copyright enforcement agenda demanded a provision which 
mandated a term in the subscribers’ contract such that their access could be 
terminated or restricted in some way as a sanction.  Such a provision would 
support graduated response measures by mandating the network operators 
to alter their terms of business to assist the rights-holders.  It was arguably a 
way to shift liability without altering the E-commerce directive and the 
‘mere conduit’ status of Internet service providers.
15
 
The European Commission obliged, and its draft of the Telecoms 
Package dated 13 November 2007
16
 contained two provisions related to 
copyright enforcement.  Only one of them will be discussed here, and it is 
the one that concerned the subscriber contracts provision.  At this stage the 
provision was known as Article 20.6 of the Universal Services directive.  
This provision said that subscribers had to be informed about copyright 
infringements and their legal consequences.  These legal consequences 
                                                 
12
 Hansard, House of Lords, Column 1307, Lord Young of Norwood Green (Jan. 26, 
2010), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100126-
0003.htm. 
13
 Cannes 2005 Declaration – Europe Day at the Cannes Film Festival (May 17, 2005), 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/cannes_decl_2005_en.pdf. 
14
 Motion Picture Association, Brussels, Public Consultation on Creative Content 
Online in the Single Market – Submission of the “Motion Picture Association” (MPA) in 
response to the Questionnaire of the European Commission regarding Policy/Regulatory 
issues 2 (Feb. 29, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/col_2008/comp/mpa_en.pdf.  
15
 Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 12 (exonerating ISPs from liability for content). 
16
 Id. 6 COM (2007) 698, art. 20.6.  
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were undefined in the directive, but it is arguable that the intended legal 
consequences were graduated response and the sanction of having Internet 
access cut off:  
 
Member States shall ensure that where contracts are concluded between 
subscribers and undertakings providing electronic communications 
services  and/or networks, subscribers are clearly informed in advance of 
the conclusion of the contract and regularly thereafter of their obligations 
to respect copyright and related rights.  Without prejudice to Directive 
2000/31/EC on electronic commerce, this includes the obligation to 
inform subscribers of the most common acts of infringements and their 
legal consequences.
17
  
 
What’s interesting here, is not only how Article 20.6 matched the rights-
holder demands,
18
 but how the rights-holders  saw it as creating a form of 
legal liability for the Internet service providers (ISP), even though, under 
the EU legal framework, ISPs  are ‘mere conduits’. See for example, this 
comment in a lobbying document from the European film producers group 
known as Eurocinema:  “The Commission's initiative is remarkable in the 
sense that it fully recognises that apart from their role as network operators 
in the infrastructure sectors, the network operators are involved in the 
means of distribution and access to content, among which is content 
protected by droit d'auteur.”
 19
 
The Article 20.6 Contracts provision neatly side-stepped mere conduit, 
because the network providers were neither expected to monitor nor to take 
responsibility for the actions of their subscribers, merely to prevent them 
from indulging in any further infringing activity.   
The matter of copyright enforcement became the subject of a raft of 
amendments in the Telecoms Package.  Article 20.6 was deleted, but its 
content was re-structured and re-drafted in two “compromise” amendments.  
Labelled “Compromises” 2 and 3, they split the provision between Article 
                                                 
17
 Electronic communications: common regulatory framework for networks and 
services, access, interconnection and authorisation ['Telecoms Package' (amend. Directives 
2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC and 2002/21/EC)]. 
18
 Eurocinema, Révision du Paquet telecoms 1 (Apr. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.eurocinema.eu/docs/Telecoms_Position_EUROCINEMA_FR_avril08.pdf 
(“Selon la Commission, les opérateurs de télécoms étant également des fournisseurs et  
distributeurs de contenu, ils doivent informer leurs clients des modalités relatives au 
respect de la propriété intellectuelle.”). 
19
 Id. (“L'initiative de la Commission est remarquable en ce sens qu'elle reconnaît 
pleinement qu'en  dehors du rôle déterminant des opérateurs de télécoms dans le secteur 
des infrastructures,  ces derniers sont impliqués dans les moyens de distribution et d'accès 
aux contenus et,  parmi ceux-ci, aux contenus légalement protégés par le droit d'auteur.”). 
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20 – Contracts and Article 21 – Transparency, but essentially they can be 
interpreted as having the same meaning.  These two “compromises” are set 
out by Eurocinema in a lobbying document (see Figure 1 below).  If 
compared against the text of Article 20.6, it can be seen that they say 
virtually the same thing but they split the provision into two.  Article 20, the 
Contracts clause, requires that the subscriber’s contract states any 
restrictions on access to content, applications and services, but the explicit 
reference to copyright is gone.  Instead, it says the contract must include 
‘information referred to in Article 21.4a.’  When we look at Article 21.4a, 
which forms part of the Transparency clause, it specifies the inclusion of 
‘infringement of copyright and related rights, and their consequences.’  It is 
notable that the re-draft incorporates the language of restrictions on access 
to content, services and applications (See Figure 1).  Eurocinema’s 
accompanying comment reflects the general rights-holder approval: “The 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection committee has adopted provisions 
which modify them slightly but which conserve the overall coherence.  We 
therefore support these provisions introduced in the Compromises 2 and 3 
in respect of Articles 20 and 21 of the Universal Services Directive (See 
Annexe 1).”
 20
 
 
                                                 
20
 Eurocinema, Lettre_depute_juillet08_final, Bruxelles 1 (Jul. 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.eurocinema.eu/docs/Lettre_depute_juillet08_final.pdf (“La commission du 
marché intérieur et de la protection des consommateurs a adopté  ces dispositions en les 
modifiant quelque peu mais en conservant la cohérence  d’ensemble. Nous soutenons donc 
les dispositions introduites par les compromis 2 et 3  visant les articles 20 et 21 de la 
directive service universel (voir annexe 1).”).  Note that the Internal Market committee of 
the European Parliament was the responsible committee for Directive 2009/140/EC.  
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Figure 1:  Compromise 2 and Compromise 3, as published by Eurocinema. 
 
Eurocinema lobbied for graduated response, and its assertion that 
Compromises 2 and 3 “conserve the coherence” of the Commission’s 
copyright amendment, implies that the above interpretation is correct, and 
that it is the one intended by the drafters.  In other words, the 
“compromises” together have the same meaning as the original Article 20.6, 
and therefore the Telecoms Package provides for broadband providers to 
10 Where Copyright Enforcement and Net Neutrality Collide  
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insert a term in their contract to support graduated response measures for 
copyright enforcement.  The provision remains in this form in the final 
version of the Universal Services Directive
21
—Article 20.1 combined with 
Article 21.4(a)—the main difference being that it is optional and not 
mandatory (it was changed from ‘shall’ to ‘may’) and ‘conditions limiting’ 
has been substituted for ‘restrictions’ (see below).  It is interesting to read 
the equivalent provision from the French Creation and Internet law, which 
implements graduated response.  It reflects the same language as this 
Telecoms Package “compromise,” notably Article L. 331-35 says that 
broadband providers must state in their contracts with subscribers, in a clear 
and readable way, the sanctions which could be incurred through violations 
of copyright.
22
  
 
IV. THE TELECOMS AGENDA:  TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
 
Having examined how the rights-holder industries targeted the 
Contracts provision and altered it to meet their requirements for copyright 
enforcement, further analysis reveals how the telecommunications industry 
targeted the same provision for the traffic management agenda.  In fact, the 
language concerning restrictions to Internet services was there precisely 
because of the traffic management agenda and the lobbying by the telecoms 
industry.  
What happened was that the telecoms industry managed to obtain the 
deletion of a set of provisions that had been carefully drafted by the 
European Commission and that sought to incorporate a policy of net 
neutrality (in the  sense of not permitting discriminatory behaviour) into the 
Telecoms Package.  This can be seen in the Commission’s first draft of the 
Package dated 13 November 2007.  The Impact Assessment for the 
Telecoms Package,
23
 discussed the Madison River case, along with the U.S. 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ‘net freedoms,’ and 
concluded that there was a need to ensure that European operators did not 
unfairly discriminate against certain types of Internet traffic.  To address 
this  possibility
24
  the European Commission had  introduced a new 
                                                 
21
 Directive 2009/140/EC. 
22
 Id.; Creation and Internet law, art. 5, § 3, Sous-sect. 3,  Art.L. 331-35 (“Les 
personnes dont l'activité est d'offrir un accès à des services de communication au public en  
ligne font figurer, dans les contrats conclus avec leurs abonnés, la mention claire et lisible 
des dispositions de  l'article L. 336-3…Elles font également figurer, dans les contrats 
conclus avec leurs abonnés, les sanctions pénales et civiles encourues en cas de violation 
des droits d'auteur et des droits voisins.). 
23
 Id. 3 European Commission SEC (2007) 1472, 90-92. 
24
 See Christopher Marsden, Net Neutrality, Bloomsbury Academic, London 141 
(2010). 
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mandate that  contracts  with subscribers had to specify any ‘limitations’ 
applicable to the service provision, as did any publicly available service 
details (transparency).  
 
Member States shall ensure that where contracts are concluded between 
subscribers and undertakings providing electronic communications 
services and/or networks, subscribers are clearly informed in advance of 
the conclusion  of a contract and regularly thereafter of any limitations 
imposed by the provider on their ability to access or distribute lawful 
content or run any lawful applications and services of their choice.
25
 
 
This clause was backed up by a minimum quality of service
26
 provision. 
Importantly, the national regulators would have overseen ‘transparency’ in 
respect of traffic management and the Commission itself would have had 
additional powers to intervene.
27
  These ‘net neutrality’ provisions would 
have been supported by a principle in the Framework directive
28
 that 
regulators must protect users’ rights to have open access to content, services 
and applications.
29
 
The European Commission’s assumption was that informed subscribers 
could choose whether to stay with an operator or switch and that non-
neutral practices could be put down to anti-competitive practices.  It 
stressed that the regulator also had overarching powers to use competition 
law as a remedy.
30
  The combination of these provisions would have 
arguably created a policy where operators could have been accountable to 
the regulators who would have overseen ‘transparency’ in the public 
interest.  However, the telecommunications industry itself pointed  out the 
flaw in this thinking, namely that competition law “could only address 
network access for electronic communications operators” and does “not 
directly address access to and for content and applications by end-users.”
31
  
                                                 
25
 6 COM (2007) 0698 Universal Service Directive (USD), arts. 20.5, 21.5. 
26
 Id. art. 22.3. 
27
 Id. arts. 21.6, 22.3.  For example, in Article 21.6, technical implementing measures 
means that  the European Commission the power to intervene, usually to ensure 
harmonization across different implementation in Member States. Guidance was provided 
by Recitals 14 and 16. 
28
 6 COM (2007) 0697 Framework Directive Art. 8.4g. 
29
  The inclusion of the words ‘lawful content’ appears to have been drawn from the 
US, and was intended to address malicious content such as viruses, but unfortunately it 
clouded the meaning of this provision, and acted as a signpost to the inclusion of copyright 
enforcement  in the Package. 
30
 3 European Commission SEC (2007) 1472, 92 n.209.  
31
 Liberty Global, Proposal Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and 
users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks; see Justification to Recital 
14.  
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On this basis, competition law was a weak power for addressing any 
discriminatory behaviour.  
The telecom operators’ requirement for traffic management meant they 
were opposed to the Commission’s net neutrality principle, and they lobbied 
against it, leading to a series of amendments when the Package passed 
through the European Parliament.  The industry had a more limited 
interpretation of a transparency requirement:  “[Consumers] will receive 
adequate information about the products / services they purchase in order to 
make the choice most appropriate to them (including, for example, such 
elements as relevant rates, terms and conditions, or any limitations that 
apply).”
32
  The outcome of their lobbying was that the Commission’s net 
neutrality provisions were deleted and replaced with language which suited 
the operators: 
 
2. Member States shall ensure that, where subscribing to services 
providing connection to a public communications network and/or 
electronic communications services, consumers and other end-users so 
requesting have a right to a contract with an undertaking or undertakings 
providing such services and/or connection.  The contract shall specify in 
a clear, comprehensive and easily accessible form at least:  
{…} 
- information on any restrictions imposed by the  provider regarding a 
subscriber's ability to access, use or distribute lawful content or run 
lawful  applications and services[.]
33
 
 
The provision was split in the same way as the copyright enforcement 
provision, between the Contracts and Transparency clauses, and the 
wording was sufficiently vague that it was not clear what kind of 
‘restrictions’ were intended.  However, the meaning was clarified in a 
further set of amendments where the word ‘restrictions’ was replaced by 
‘traffic management policies’
34
 and incontrovertibly revealed that this 
provision was about restricting Internet services via the use of traffic 
                                                 
32
 5 Net Confidence Coalition, supra note 5, 1  
33
 European Parliament, COD(2007)0248 P6_TA(2008)0452, Texts Adopted By 
Parliament  Wednesday, 24 September 2008—Brussels Provisional edition Electronic 
communications networks and services, protection of privacy and consumer protection, 
Amendments 61 and 62 (Sept 24, 2008).   
34
 Council of the European Union 16497/08, Common position adopted by the Council 
with a view to the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic 
communications networks, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation 33 pt. 13, art. 20.1(b) (Feb. 9 
2009) (Information on the provider's traffic management policies). 
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management systems.  However, the telecommunications industry did not 
like this change and policy-makers were subjected to heavy lobbying to 
amend the text back to ‘restrictions.’  
Lobbying documents reveal who these stakeholders were.  AT&T, 
Liberty Global and ETNO (European Telecommunications Network 
Operators) were notably aggressive in lobbying.
35
  Their preferred text was 
“restrictions imposed by the understanding on their ability to access content 
or run applications and services of their choice.”
36
  The UK authorities also 
intervened, proposing amendments that, according to their preamble, were 
intended to enable network operators to offer prioritised services or service 
bundles:  “There is nothing in the Framework or elsewhere in the European 
law preventing a service provider from providing subscribers with access to 
pre-defined and differentiated set of services or applications.”
37
 
The European Parliament acceded to these lobbying demands, and it 
replaced ‘traffic management policies,’ but instead of ‘restrictions’ it used 
‘conditions limiting’:  ‘information on any other conditions limiting access 
to and/or use of services and applications, where such conditions are 
permitted under national law in accordance with Community law.’
 38
  This 
language had the effect of obscuring the meaning again and enabled policy-
makers to brush it aside—as was evident from the fact that the Parliament 
carried the directive with almost no opposition.  Simultaneously, the 
Parliament’s amendments weakened the regulatory powers by, for example, 
removing the Commission’s powers to address non-transparent or 
restrictive behaviour.
39
  This change has proved to be pivotal.  It had the 
effect of altering the meaning to the effect that operators had to tell 
subscribers about restrictions to the service, but they risked little in the form 
of regulatory intervention.   
 
V. COLLISION COURSE 
 
The above analysis has illustrated how two political lobby groups 
pursued their own agendas in respect of the Telecoms Package and how 
                                                 
35
 Kevin J. O’Brien,  US lobbyists angle for influence in Europe’s net neutrality 
debate, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2009).  
36
 See Liberty Global, supra note 31, handwritten amendments to Article 21.  
37
 See UK Proposed Amendments (Feb. 25, 2009).  This document is understood to 
have originated from the UK regulator, Ofcom. 1 Rationale, and 2 Amendment to Article 
20, available at 
http://www.laquadrature.net/files/UK_PROPOSED_AMENDMENTS_on_net_neutrality_
DRAFT_20090223_print.pdf. 
38
 Directive 2009/136/EC, Article 20.1 (b) second bullet point.  
39
 COM(2007) 698  Article 21.6 was deleted, and the regulatory powers in Article 22.3 
weakened. 
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they targeted the same clause.  It is arguable that it suited them both to have 
the compromise with a split provision and obscured wording to cover 
Internet restrictions.  The connection between the two agendas becomes 
more obvious in the final version of the Telecoms Package.  A provision 
was inserted which makes it explicit that operators are not forbidden from 
imposing restrictions on Internet subscribers and are therefore permitted to 
do so, provided they tell them:  “This Directive neither mandates nor 
prohibits conditions, imposed by providers of publicly available electronic 
communications and services, limiting users' access to and/or use of 
services and applications…but lays down an obligation to provide 
information regarding such conditions.”
 40
 
The second sentence of this provision addresses the right of EU Member 
State governments to impose measures using such restrictions:  “National 
measures regarding end-users' access to or use of services and applications 
through electronic communications networks…”
41
  Thus it makes a direct 
link between the operator’s right to restrict subscribers, as in the Contracts 
provision, and measures that could be imposed by the governments of EU 
Member States.  It does not define ‘national measures,’ but one way to 
understand it is to consider the UK Digital Economy Act 2010.  This Act 
includes national measures for copyright enforcement, where Internet 
subscribers alleged to infringe copyright will be sanctioned by ordering the 
ISPs to impose ‘technical measures’:   
 
a technical measure is a measure that limits the speed or other 
capacity of the service provided to a subscriber; prevents a 
subscriber from using the service to gain access to particular 
material, or limits such use;   suspends the service provided to a 
subscriber; or  limits the service provided to a subscriber in another 
way.
 42
 
 
‘Limiting the speed’ or ‘limiting the use’ of the subscriber’s connection 
implies the use of traffic management systems.  Thus, in the Digital 
Economy Act there is a direct connection between graduated response and 
traffic management, where graduated response requires a restriction on 
Internet access as a sanction and where traffic management will be used to 
apply the restriction.  It is arguable that the language and the split structure 
the Contracts provision of the Telecoms Package suited the drafters of the 
                                                 
40
 Directive 2009/136/EC, Universal Services and Users Rights Directive, Article 1.3. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Digital Economy Act, Section 9, 124G Obligations to limit internet access: 
assessment and preparation, cl. 3; see also Marsden, supra note 24, 177-178. 
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Digital Economy Act.  The Act must comply with EU law, and since it 
amends the UK Communications Act 2003, it must specifically comply 
with the Telecoms Package.  
It is clear from policy documents that the European legislators 
understood that the “national measures” referred to “restrictions on a user's 
internet access”
43 
 and related directly to graduated response.  This is why, 
in the final agreement of 4 November 2009, they drafted a provision which 
could act as a barrier to graduated response.  The final agreement is a 
provision in the Framework directive which imposes an obligation on all 
Member States.
44
  It repeats the same language, referring again to measures 
which restrict subscribers Internet access “measures regarding end-users’ 
access to, or use of, services and applications through electronic 
communications network.” and it adds the qualification “liable to restrict 
fundamental rights or freedoms”—this is an intentional reference to 
graduated response.  The barrier which they incorporated was the ‘prior, 
fair and impartial hearing’ which was intended to remind European 
national governments of the legal requirement for due process
45
 when 
individuals are sanctioned, and to act as an instruction that States should not 
permit graduated response measures which bypass due process.
46
 
 
VI. HOW THE CONTRACTS PROVISION SUPPORTS BOTH AGENDAS 
 
During the passage of the Telecoms Package through the European 
legislature, it was observable that the telecommunications industry opposed 
graduated response.  For example, the European Telecommunications 
Network Operators (ETNO) even issued public statements in support of the 
European Parliament’s stance on this issue.
47
  However, in reality they put 
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up a weak fight.  It was not clear from observing the process whether the 
telecommunications operators understood the implications and colluded, or 
whether they were too keen to get traffic management provisions and failed 
to realise how their requirements connected with copyright enforcement.  In 
the year since the Telecoms Package passed into law, their attitude has 
become more open, and the connection between the traffic management 
agenda and the copyright enforcement agenda has strengthened. 
France is a particularly interesting case in point.  The broadband 
provider SFR began selling the iPad, minus connectivity to Voice over IP 
(Voip) services, peer-to-peer file-sharing, or bulletin boards.
48
  Whilst 
blocking Voip would appear to be an anti-competitive move in relation to 
voice services, blocking specific peer-to-peer file-sharing protocols and 
access to bulletin board services relates directly to copyright enforcement.  
Another French ISP, called ‘Free’ has also been reported blocking peer-to-
peer protocols.
49
  All French mobile operators block peer-to-peer.
50
  Such 
blocking is voluntary, and there is a competitive market in France.  Under 
the European Commission’s logic outlined above, subscribers would be free 
to switch if they were not happy with these restrictions.  However, the 
French situation illustrates the flawed logic in this thinking.  A cartel-like 
collusion means that choice on this matter is removed.  If all mobile 
operators offer and ‘unlimited’ tariff, but block peer-to-peer, where does the 
peer-to-peer user go for service?  
What is also emerging in France in the final months of 2010 is how the 
graduated response—and ‘co-operation’ with its requirements—may be 
bartered for other favours from the government.  The capitulation of the 
French broadband providers with the Creation and Internet law 
requirements has been linked to a deal at government level.  At the time of 
writing, the existence of the deal had been confirmed by the Culture 
Minister Frédéric Mitterand, but the substance had not.  It was believed that 
                                                 
48
 See SFR Advertisement, available at 
http://img.telecomix.org/EU/src/127728743242.png.  ("Ne permet ni usages voix ni SMS, 
Peer To Peer, Voix sur IP et Newsgroups interdit."). 
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 Guillaume Champeau, Free briderait les protocoles SSH, VoIP ou P2P en zone non 
dégroupée, in Numerama, http://www.numerama.com/magazine/15461-free-briderait-les-
protocoles-ssh-voip-ou-p2p-en-zone-non-degroupee.html (Apr. 9, 2010) (“Free…aurait de 
nouveau décidé de brider certaines pratiques de ses abonnés’…"Les bridages bloqueraient 
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jouer à des jeux en ligne, d’utiliser des applications telles que le SSH, de regarder des 
vidéos en streaming, d’utiliser des applications de VoIP ou de peer-to-peer, etc.").  
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 Marc Rees, Orange autorise la VoIP en 3G, l'Internet illimité enfin moins limité, in 
PC Inpact, http://www.pcinpact.com/actu/news/56368-iphone-orange-voip-3g-illimite.htm 
(Apr. 14, 2010) (“L’illimité ne l’est cependant toujours pas avec l’impossibilité par 
exemple d’accéder au P2P sur ces forfaits mobiles.”).  
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the deal concerned traffic management.
51
  The likelihood of collusion of the 
French ISPs with the government is further substantiated by their reaction to 
the ISP Free’s refusal to transmit the graduated response emails.  Free has 
been accused by other ISPs of breaking up the competitive landscape.  They 
had hoped that if all co-operated, none could suffer competitive 
disadvantage from accusations of collaboration with a much-disliked law.  
The Minister has threatened Free with a hefty fine if it continues to refuse to 
co-operate.  Free is also accused of using graduated response to get the 
government’s blessing for its own proprietary—and non-neutral—network 
services.
52
  
The UK situation is evolving.  The two largest broadband providers, BT 
and TalkTalk are simultaneously challenging the copyright enforcement 
sections of the Digital Economy Act in the courts,
53
 and saying that they 
would be prepared to charge extra for prioritisation of services such as 
broadcast television.
54
  A number of the broadband providers are throttling 
traffic.  Their tactic, less transparent than the French, is to use bandwidth 
caps and speed restrictions to make peer-to-peer file-sharing difficult.  An 
example is Virgin Media, as indicated by its terms of service.
55
 
In Ireland, a court judgment in respect of the Irish telecoms operator 
eircom, which was sued by the Irish Recorded Music Industry Association 
known as IRMA, implements a privately-contracted implementation of 
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graduated response measures.
56
  Two aspects of the agreement are notable 
in this context.  Firstly, that “Eircom has . . . an acceptable usage contract 
with its customers mandating termination for illegal internet use.  Eircom 
takes its customer contract seriously.”
57
 
Secondly, eircom agreed to comply with an application to block The 
Pirate Bay,
58
 which would arguably count as a restriction.  The significance 
of the contractual terms are discussed in a second Irish judgment of October 
2010, where the network operator, UPC is admonished by the judge for 
failing to enforce the contract with its subscribers in respect of copyright:  
“The customer use policy of UPC makes it very clear that the internet service 
of UPC cannot be used to steal copyright material.  This is a matter of 
contract, and for a breach of this obligation by the customer, UPC can 
terminate the contract.”
59
 
It would therefore appear to be a reasonable interpretation that the 
Contracts provision in the Telecoms Package supports not only graduated 
response measures, but any other restrictions on Internet access and 
services, and if carried out for the purpose of copyright enforcement, they 
will not be opposed by the regulators who are charged with overseeing the 
implementation of the Package.  Indeed, the regulators appear to take the 
view that restrictions which support copyright enforcement are acceptable.  
The UK regulator, Ofcom, works on the premise that traffic management 
will be used, and has indicated in a consultation document that, in its 
opinion, traffic management could be applied for copyright enforcement 
measures:“Traffic management per se is neither good nor bad.  For example, 
it is widely accepted that the blocking of illegal content (such as images of 
child abuse) is necessary and that steps taken to address issues such as online 
copyright infringement would be viewed as acceptable traffic 
management.”
60
 
Ofcom has seriously considered using deep packet inspection—a 
function of traffic management systems which opens the packets of data to 
inspect the internal content—for its own purposes, to monitor file-sharing 
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19 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-17 
 
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
on UK networks.
61
  Ofcom’s French counterpart, the ARCEP, believes that 
‘non-neutral’ controls, put in place for copyright enforcement, do not 
infringe fundamental rights and reflect a legitimate public interest.
62
  The 
European Commission, which oversees regulation across the EU, does not 
name copyright enforcement, but it is implied as an acceptable non-neutral 
traffic management activity:  “In future, traffic may also be managed to 
ensure that legal obligations are met in some Member States, particularly for 
example with regard to illegal content.”
 63
 
Whether or not these regulators are acting in the public interest, is a 
quite different question.  Their position is opposed by citizens’ groups in 
Europe.  La Quadrature du Net, for example, opposed the Telecoms 
Package on the basis that graduated response would infringe the 
fundamental rights of European citizens, and consistently called for an 
open, neutral Internet infrastructure to be protected in Europe.  The citizens’ 
group suggests that the EU has imported into the Telecoms Package a weak 
and ‘minimalist’ regulatory position and has set out a demand that net 
neutrality should be established as a policy principle in the EU.
64
  
Retrospectively, it is asking for the loop-hole in the Telecoms Package to be 
closed.  
Both the ARCEP and the European Commission give some 
consideration to the citizenship aspects of net neutrality, for example, the 
Commission asks whether there are issues concerning freedom of 
expression.  However, as evidenced above, the operators have the first-
mover advantage and governments are countenancing non-neutral 
behaviour to enforce copyright.  
 
VII. FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
This paper has argued that amendments to a Contracts provision in the 
Telecoms Package reveal how European policy-makers were targeted by 
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two lobby groups, and how those policy-makers managed to address their 
demands by contriving a language and structure which suited both agendas.  
What they concocted was a directive which arguably enables both traffic 
management and graduated response.  The paper has also investigated how 
this legislation translates into practice, where traffic management 
implements graduated response, and becomes an alternative form of 
copyright enforcement.  In this context, the Telecoms Package is enabling 
law and a small change has big implications.  It arguably subverts the 
general purpose telecoms framework to allow network providers control 
over non-transport functions, specifically, over content.
65
  It does not 
specify explicitly any change of policy for copyright enforcement.  It 
legally cannot do so since it is, of course, not copyright law.  Its function is 
to set out the rules for network operators in order that their operations may 
be consistent across the EU—this is what in the past would have been their 
license.  However, it can—and it does—provide general instructions to 
network operators which are necessary for the implementation of copyright 
enforcement on electronic network services, and instructions for operators 
who want to restrict subscribers in any other way.  
The copyright enforcement agenda is moving into other policy fora, 
such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) which calls for 
‘co-operative efforts… to address…copyright infringement.’  It is certainly 
arguable that the broadband providers’ good-will is required, not merely to 
put the copyright enforcement terms in their contract but also to enforce 
them.  It is also arguable that they will find ways to use graduated response 
as a bargaining chip against various forms of traffic management, and the 
Telecoms Package Contracts provision facilitates them doing so. 
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